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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
000O000

DEMETRIOS AGATHANGELIDES
and DIANE AGATHANGELIDES,
husband and wife, and GREEK
GARDENS, a Utah corporation,
Plaintiffs/
Respondents.
vs.
KEITH SHAW and SANDRAW SHAW,
husband and wife, each
individually and d/b/a
SPRINGCOLOR SYSTEMS, INC.,

APPELLANTfS
BRIEF ON APPEAL
Case No.

19113

Defendants/
Appellants.

NATURE OF THE CASE
The portion of this case which is on appeal arises
out of Plaintiffs1 sale of a sprinkler installation business
to Defendant Springcolor Systems, Inc. The sale arrangements
were set forth in an Agreement and attached Promissory Note.
Appendix Documents #1 (Agreement and Note). Plaintiffs brought
suit to collect the Note. Defendants answered and counterclaimed
raising affirmative defenses of failure of consideration because
of Plaintiffs1 breach of the Agreement and requested attorneys
fees therefore. See Appendix Documents #2 (Complaint), #3
(Answer) and #4 (Counterclaim).
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The Plaintiff's Complaint, filed 12 August 1980,
against Defendant involved two claims stated as separate causes

-1Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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of action. The First Cause of Action was a suit brought solely
against Defendant Keith Shaw individually and d/b/a Springcolor
Systems, Inc. on the $10,333.78
Promissory Note given for the
purchase of the sprinkler installation business. See Appendix
Document #3 (Complaint). The Second Cause of Action was an
unrelated claim of Plaintiff against Defendants Keith Shaw and
Sandra Shaw for partnership contributions of $46,667.67 arising
out of an alleged partnership to construct improvements at the
Willow Creek Golf Course. Id. This Second Cause of Action was
voluntarily dismissed by the Plaintiffs with prejudice on July 12,
1982. Hearing Transcript of July 12, 1982 at pp. 1, 4-5.
Upon Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on the
First Cause of Action, the court entered a Memorandum Decision.
Appendix Document #5. That Decision provides in relevant part
that Plaintiff is granted summary judgment on the Promissory Note
but that Defendant will be allowed to try the "affirmative defenses
and counterclaims" relative to the Note and Agreement "there
appearing to be factual issues for determination at trial." Id.
Defendant Shaw timely objected to the Order tendered by the
Plaintiff, urging that no summary judgment could be granted "while
affirmative defenses unresolved remain outstanding". Court
File at 270. Nevertheless the court entered an Order granting
summary judgment while simultaneously finding Defendant's
Affirmative Defenses and Counterclaims presented factual issues
for determination at trial. Court File at 271.
On February 8th and 9th of 1982 the remaining issues
were tried to a jury. The court announced to the jury at the
beginning of the trial that it had granted summary judgment to

1

*

(

{

^

I
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-3the Plaintiff on the note against the Defendant and that the
jury need only fix attorneys fees on that claim. ReporterT s
Transcript at 40. No mention is made that Defendant has
affirmative defenses with respect to the Notes which are to be
tried. Id. at 40-41. Defendant was allowed to introduce at
trial all of the evidence supporting the affirmative defenses;
to wit that Plaintiff breached the noncompetition clause of the
Agreement and also that Plaintiff failed to correctly pay over
monies as requried in the Agreement between the parties.
The Special Verdict form presented to the jury made
no allowance for affirmative defenses relative to the Note.
Appendix Document #6 (Special Verdict Form) . Defendant's counsel
duly and timely objected and excepted to the form of the special
verdict. Reporters Transcript at (Vol.11) 233-235. The jury
returned entering the sum of $4500.00 in answer to Question #1 and
circling the answer (b) as to Question #2. See Appendix Document
#6 (Special Verdict Form) .
Thereafter the parties disputed what judgment should
be rendered on the Special Verdict Form. The court rendered a
Memorandum Decision respecting the issues raised. Appendix
Document #7 (Memorandum Decision). The court then subsequently
entered judgment for the Plaintiff against Keith Shaw, Springcolor
Systems, Inc. , a Utah corporation and Sandra Shaw for the full amoi
of the note, interest, $4800.00 attorneys fees and $471.40 costs.
Appendix Document #8 (Judgment). Defendants moved: (1) for a
new trial, (2) judgment notwithstanding the verdict, (3)
restriction of the judgment to Springcolor Systems, Inc.
(4) segregation and/or denial of costs assessed, (5) entry
of findings of fact and conclusions of law with respect to the

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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issues decided by the trial court and (6) objected to the
form of judgment. All of Defendant's motions were denied.
appeal followed.

(

This

I
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
1. Sandra Shaw requests that the judgment against her
be vacated by this Court.
2. Defendants request that the Court find that as a
matter of law breach of the Agreement by Plaintiff constituted
a valid affirmative defense to payment of the Note. Further,
that based on the jury verdict findings of a breach by the Plaintiffs
and the tender offers made by the Defendant, that an order be
entered by this Court directing the trial court to:
(a)

Strike from the judgment any award of attorneys
fees to the Plaintiff.

(b)

Strike from the judgment any award of interest
to the Plaintiff.

(c)

Strike from the judgment any award of costs to
the Plaintiff.

(d)

Conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine and
award to Defendant an offset for the actual attorneys
fees and costs incurred by Defendants in defense
and prosecution relative to the Plaintiff's First
1
Cause of Action and Defendant1^ Affirmative
Defenses and Counterclaims.

(e)

Conduct an evidentiary hearing, if the parties
can't stipulate, as to the offset to be allowed
Defendant Shaw for Plaintiff's breach of the noncompetition agreement and failure to pay over
monies. (One or both of these breaches by the
Plaintiff were found to have occurred by the
j^y.)

(f)

Enter further orders consistent herewith.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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As an alternative to the above to simply vacate

the judgment and remand for new trial.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The Plaintiffs formally executed sale documents on
June 27, 1979 for sale of a sprinkler installation business to
Springcolor Systems, Inc., a Utah corporation. The sale documents
were an Agreement and attached Promissory Note. The Agreement
provided in relevant part that $18,971.73 would be credited to
Springcolor Systems, Inc. for monies received on subcontracts
where Defendant worked for Plaintiff Greek Gardens. The
Agreement also provided that Plaintiffs would not compete with
Springcolor Systems and that 107o of the purchase price was for
purchase of "good will11. The Agreement also specified that the
balance of $10,333.75 owing by Springcolor Systems, Inc. to
the Plaintiffs would bear interest at fourteen percent (14%)
and be payable in $400 a month installments. See Appendix Document
#1.
Simultaneously with the execution of this Agreement a
Promissory Note was also executed and attached to the Agreement.
This note simply restated the terms for the payment of the
balance owing. The amount of the Note was $10,333.78 payable
at 14% in $400.00 a month installments. The Note and Agreement
were executed simultaneously, bearing the same payment terms
and the same date; the Note simply quotes a portion of the
Agreement. The Plaintiffs are the payees of the Note and it is
executed by Springcolor Systems, Inc., a Utah corporation.
One payment was made on this obligation when the
parties became embroiled in a dispute. Springcolor Systems, Inc.,
refused to pay any further money alleging Plaintiffs were
violating the non-competition agreement and were refusing to
pay over additional monies earned on subcontracts between
Plaintiffs and Springcolor. Plaintiffs took the position that

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6Springcolor was not entitled to the subcontract monies and that
Plaintiffs were not in breach of the non-competition agreement.
An additional dispute was between the Plaintiffs and
Defendants Shaw over whether or not an earlier partnership had
existed involving the Willow Creek Golf Club and whether or not
the Shaws owed the Plaintiffs money as a partnership contribution
thereon.

'

'

Prior to Plaintiffs filing the lawsuit against Defendants
Shaw, Springcolor offered to pay in full the balance owed on
the Agreement and Note, including interest. Reporter's Transcript
at pp. 137-138, see generally at pp. 133-140. Springcolorfs
offer to abandon its claim for Plaintiffs refusal to pay over
g
subcontract money and for Plaintiff's violation of the noncompetition agreement was conditional .upon the dismissal of any
and all other claims Plaintiffs might have against Springcolor
or Defendants Shaw including the alleged Willowcreek partnership
«
contribution claim. Id.
Plaintiffs refused that offer and commenced a lawsuit
against Defendants. The Complaint named as Defendants "Keith
Shaw and Sandra Shaw, husband and wife, each individually, and
4
1
d/b/a SPRINGCOLOR SYSTEMS, INC.' The Defendant Keith Shaw and
the Defendant Sandra Shaw were served.
The First Cause of Action in the Complaint is against
Defendants Springcolor and Keith Shaw on the Promissory Note.
%
It alleges nonpayment and a number of allegations are made to
the effect that Defendant Keith Shaw was an alter ego of
Springcolor and that the Springcolor corporate veil should be
pierced so as to allow a personal judgment against Defendant Keith •
Shaw. The prayer for relief names Springcolor Systems, Inc.
and tha Defendant Keith Shaw and requests the note amount
($9,842.11), interest, $4000.00 attorneys fees and $10,000.00

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-7punitive damages.

Defendant Sandra Shaw is not named in the

First Cause of Action.
The Second Cause of Action is against Defendants Keith
Shaw and Sandra Shaw for partnership contribution on the alleged
Willowcreek Partnership. The sum of $46,667.67 is requested
in the prayer for relief.
Defendants, Springcolor and Keith Shaw answered
the First Cause of Action admitting execution of the promissory
note but alleging t!the same was part and parcel of an agreement
not performed by Plaintiffs'1. Defendants also pled as an
affirmative defense that:
Plaintiffs are estopped from suing hereon having
failed to perform their agreement with Defendants
which was the consideration for said note.
See Appendix Document #3, Paragraph #8. The counterclaim
filed later specified Plaintiff's breaches of the Agreement:
That Plaintiffs have breached their agreement of
June 27, 1979, with Defendants in that Plaintiffs
have failed to account for funds due Defendants
on subcontracts, have entered into competition against
Defendants and have failed to release Defendants
from liability on the Willowcreek project.
See Appendix Document #4, Counterclaim at Paragraph #1.
Because of the cost and risks of litigation Defendants
endeavored to settle or compromise the monetary obligation on
the Agreement and Note to Plaintiffs. That is, Defendants were
willing in a settlement made to waive Plaintiff's breaches of the
Agreement to avoid the costs and risks of litigation. There
were no less than four separate offers to pay principal and intere
in full to the Plaintiff; to wit:
1.
2.

Oral offer prior to filing of suit
Written Letter to Plaintiff4"s Attorney of
December 12, 1980. Appendix Document #9
(Exhibit #
) .
3. Offer of Judgment dated February 4, 1981.
Appendix Document #10.
4. byOffer
ofHunter
Judgment
dated
November
Digitized
the Howard W.
Law Library, J. Reuben
Clark Law
School, BYU. 23, 1981.
Machine-generated
OCR, may contain
errors.
ADDendix
Document
#11.

-8These offers were met with the repeated refusal of Plaintiffs
to accept any of the offers. Plaintiffs insisted initially
that it would not dismiss the partnership claim. Later when
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed that claim there was an
i

insistence that significant attorneys fees be paid.
File at 158.

See Court

The Plaintiffs proceeded with extensive discovery
relating primarily to the second cause of action. See Court File
Index. Several motions for summary judgment by Plaintiffs were
denied by the court. See Court File at 100 and 157. At the
initial time set for trial Plaintiffs moved orally to dismiss
their second cause of action with prejudice and for a summary
judgment on the first cause of action. Defendants accepted the
dismissal of the second cause of action with prejudice. Hearing
Transcript of July 12, 1982 at pp. 1, 4-5. At that point Sandra
Shaw ceased to be a party. Defendants proceeded to object to
further delays and also to the timing of Plaintiff's motions.
Over Defendants objections the court granted a continuance so
that written motions could be presented by the Plaintiffs. Id.
The Plaintiffs then presented their third motion for
summary judgment on the first cause of action. The Defendants
filed the same responses, admitting the execution of the note
but alleging failure of consideration as earlier set forth.
The court,, however, this time acting through the newly appointed
Judge Call, rendered a partial summary judgment on the note
against Springcolor Systems, Inc. for principal and interest
noting however that "PlaintiffTs Motion for dismissal of
Defendant's affirmative defenses and counterclaims for
breach of contract and attorneys fees is denied, there
appearing to be factual issues for determination at trial."

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

,

^

|

4

•

-9The court also proceeded to state that it reserved for trial
"the liability of Keith Shaw and Sandra Shaw on the note and
attorneys fees to Plaintiffs on the note.11 See Memorandum
Decision and Order, Appendix Documents #5 and #6.
The Defendants timely and properly noted that no
partial summary judgment could be rendered when affirmative
defenses remained unresolved. Appendix Document #7. Nevertheless, given the judgefs wording and Rule 56(d) the court's
action may properly be an "order specifying the facts that appear
without substantial controversy.11 It should be noted that
Defendant Shaw admitted execution of the note, what payments
had been made and the method of calculation of interest.
Defendants sole defense was failure of consideration stated three
ways in the pleadings, to-wit: as a denial of the Plaintiff's
allegation of "good and valuable consideration"; as an
affirmative defense and again as a counterclaim for nonperformance
of the agreement. See Answer and Counterclaim, Appendix Documents
#3 and #4.
Under these rulings the matter proceeded to trial.
The judge commenced the trial by announcing to the jury that
he had rendered summary judgment to the Plaintiffs on the Note
and all they needed to decide on that cause of action was what
were reasonable attorneys fees. Reporter?s Transcript at Vol. I
40.
The court then proceeded to hear testimony relating to
!
Plaintiff s attorneys fees. Over Defendants1 objections
Plaintiff,1 s attorney was not required to segregate time between
the two causes of action or for time spent relative to piercing
the corporate veil. ReporterTs Transcript at Vol. II 37-49. See e
37-39. In fact, Plaintiff's attorney was allowed to take the
stand and, without a question and answer format, discuss legal
fees and his billings in general. Reporter's Transcript Vol. II
at 34-40. The mutual provision for attorneys fees was contained
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-10in both the Agreement and Note signed by the parties. Plaintiff's <
attorney introduced legal billings relating to the second cause
of action, piercing the corporate veil, and defending the counterclaim without any time segregation whatsoever.
The Defendants
objections are duly noted in the record. Reporter's Transcript
*
Vol II at 37-39. The Defendants also note that offers were made
to pay the note in full before litigation began. See Statement
of Facts at page 7
These offers were refused not because
Defendants refused to pay the note but because Plaintiffs insisted *
on pursuing the Willowcreek Partnership claim which they later
abandoned.
In chambers, the court prepared instructions and a
special verdict form. The Defendants attorney duly objected
to the verdict form as the same did not allow for findings related
to the allegations of affirmative defenses. Reporter's Transcript
Vol II at 233-235. The court then stated and found as a matter
of law that inasmuch as the note was a negotiable instrument the
defense of failure of consideration was barred. The court did
indicate that were Defendants Shaw to prevail on their counterclaim he would only allow an offset. See Special Verdict Form,
Appendix Document #6.
The jury returned the verdict form with the sum
$4,800.00 as an answer to question #1 and with "bfl "both parties"
as an answer to question #2. I_d. The jury was directed to
answer no further questions. Id. The Defendant has always
admitted making no payments on the note so the jury had to find
Defendant breached the Agreement because it simply restates the
Note. Compare the Agreement at Paragraph 2(b)(2) with the Note.
See Answer at Paragraphs 2-4. Appendix Documents #1 and #3.
The jury finding that Plaintiffs also breached the Agreement
indicated the jury affirmatively found that Plaintiffs violated
the agreement by competing with the Defendant and/or refusing
to pay over monies. Defendant won its case showing a valid
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

m

g

f

4

•

-11affirmative defense and counterclaim.
The Defendants have filed numerous objections to the
entering of the court's judgment, motions for new trial, etc.
The court has denied all such motions. The court entered
judgment against Defendant Keith Shaw, Defendant Sandra Shaw and
Springcolor Systems, Inc. in the amount of $9,842.11 plus interest,
attorneys fees of $4800.00 plus costs of $471.40. Appendix
Document #12.
In reviewing this case the Court must accept the
legitimacy of the jury finding that Plaintiffs breached the
Agreement. Defendants alleged three specific breaches by Plaintiff
to wit:
1.
2.
3.

Failure to account for monies as required by
Paragraph 6 of the Agreement.
Failure to abide by the noncompetitions clause
as required by Paragraph 4 of the Agreement.
Failure to grant a release on Willowcreek
partnership. (Defendants always denied any
liability and the existence of this partnership this objection later became irrelevant as Plaintiffs
dismissed this claim with prejudice.

Answer at Paragraphs 3 and 8, Appendix Document #3; Counterclaim
at Paragraph 1, Appendix Document #4.
At trial Defendants sought to prove the affirmative
defense of failure of consideration by the two specific breaches
stated at (1) and (2). The failure to turn over monies related
to a specific identified incident where Plaintiff refused to turn
over $1802.00. That incident occurred prior to Defendant's
refusal to pay monthly installments on the Agreement and Note.
The other breach related to the Plaintiff1s activities in several
bidding contests wherein the Plaintiff bid on sprinkler only jobs
and to Plaintifff s interrelationship with one of Defendants
principal competitors. The Plaintiffs denied any breach and
contested the affirmative defenses. The jury, finding that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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Plaintiffs breached the Agreement must indicate as a matter
of law that Defendant proved either one or both of these
alleged breaches. The clumsy verdict form, however, does
not allow for \ more specificity. The finding that Defendant
also had breached the Agreement is obvious because the Agreement
restates the obligation to pay $400.00 monthly installments and
Defendant freely admitted he was not making those because of
Plaintifff;s prior breaches. As the Note is restated in the ....
Agreement no other conclusions aire possible. No other breach of
the Agreement other than non-payment was ever alleged against
the Defendant.
In summary, the Court by reason of a careful review
of the jury special verdict can factually determine affirmatively
that Plaintiff did breach the Agreement and that Defendant
did prove the affirmative defenses.
ARGUMENT
I.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT.

The trial court on August 19, 1982, rendered a
Memorandum Decision granting Plaintiff partial summary judgment.
See Memorandum Decision, Appendix Document #5. Subsequently this
Decision was set forth in an Order.
Court File at 267;
The Decision and Order each recite that Defendant's
affirmative defenses remain to be decided as there are "factual
issues for determination at trial.ff It is Defendants position
that it is legally improper to render a summary judgment where an
affirmative defense remains undecided. See Rule 56 URCP.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-13Specifically in this case Defendant alleged that
there was a failure of consideration, i.e. that the Defendant
did not receive good and valuable consideration for the Note
inasmuch as Plaintiffs were in actual and open breach of the
Agreement for which the Note was given, to wit:
1.
2.

Plaintiffs were competing with Defendant; and
Plaintiffs were refusing to pay over subcontract
monies.

Defendant Springcolor admitted execution, delivery, amour
interest and non payment of the Note but alleged a prior breach
by Plaintiff of the Agreement. Under these circumstances it would
have been entirely appropriate for the trial court pursuant to
Rule 56(d) "to have made an order specifying the facts that
appear without substantial controversy11. The court could have
done that with respect to Defendant's admission of execution,
delivery, amount, accrued interest and non payment of the Note.
To have gone further and actually rendered a judgment while an
affirmative defense was outstanding was error.
Defendant justifiably could be expected to relft on the
court's promise embodied in both the Memorandum Decision and
Order that it would allow trial of the affirmative defenses.
Under this factual situation the error was avoided by the
Defendant's ability to obtain a stay and post a bond or letter
of credit until trial. This the Defendant elected to do, a
letter of credit was posted and a stay obtained. When the
court during the trial reversed itself and held the Defendant's
affirmative defenses were not affirmative defenses it made the err
insurmountable. Defendant was misled by the express words of the
court; the court refused to abide by its own orders. See
Memorandum Decision and Order, Appendix Documents # 5.
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Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-14-

II.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS LEGAL RULINGS RESPECTING
THE NOTE AND DEFENSES THERETO.
The trial court separated the Note and Agreement and

treated them as separate legal obligations.

*

The trial court

found that Plaintiff's breach of the Agreement would not be
a defense to Defendant's nonpayment of the Note.

The trial

*

court also found the defense of failure of consideration was
invalid because the Plaintiff was a holder in due course of
the Note and as such was insulated from this defense.

Defendant

submits that the trial court is in error as a matter of law
on each of the foregoing conclusions of law.
The duties and obligations as set forth in the Agreement
and its attached Note were mutual and reciprocal.

Indeed the

two documents for all purposes should be regarded as one
agreement.
The well-settled rule that instruments relating
to the same transaction and contemporaneously
executed are to be considered as one instrument
and are to be read and construed together as such
in determining the intent of the parties, if the
instruments are not contradictory, applies to
bills and notes and writings in connection therewith, as between the original parties and all
persons charged with notice, especially where the
instruments are executed for the same purpose, or
where the bill or note incorporates the provisions
of another agreement, or refers to it, or is attached
to the other agreement.

g

4

11 AmJur 2d Bills and Notes §70 at 94. (emphasis added, footnotes •
omitted). The evidence at trial indicated that the two documents
refer to the same transaction, were contemporaneously executed,
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
were executed
for the
same purpose, incorporated the same
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-15provisions and were attached to each other.
Under the rule that contemporaneous written agreements are construed together as parts of one contract,
there can be no objection, as between the parties
. thereto, to evidence of a contemporaneous written
agreement on the ground that it tends to vary the
effect of the contract on a bill or note. Evidence
of the entire contract in its several parts is
admissable to determine the rights of the parties.
In an action between the original parties to a note
where it is alleged that the note was a part of a
transaction for the sale and purchase of stock in a
corporation, the entire transaction being evidenced
by the note, the stock certificate, and an escrow
arrangement, it is appropriate to show all the documents evidencing the agreement between the parties as
constituting the entire transaction as distinguished
from merely producing the promissory note as an
isolated segment of the transaction.
12 AmJur 2d Bills and Notes §1244 at 276. (footnotes omitted).
The two documents are irretrievably bound together for purposes
of interpretation and enforceability. One cannot reasonably
contend that the promissory note can be enforced as though it
were an "isolated segment of the transaction." Yet that is
exactly what the trial court did. See Special Verdict Form
Appendix Document #6
The Uniform Commercial Code, in setting forth the rights
and duties of parties dealing w ith documents which may become
negotiable instruments specifically delineates this exception to
negotiability:
(1) As between the obligor and his immediate obligee
or any transferee the terms of an instrument may be
modified or affected by any other written agreement
executed as a part of the same transaction, except
that a holder in due course is not affected by any
limitation of his rights arising out of the separate
written agreement if he had no notice of the limitation when he took the instrument.
§70A-3-119 UCA 1953. The Plaintiffs cannot enforce this
obligation set forth in the Note in a vacuum. As a matter of
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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law; Plaintiff's rights under the Note are bound to Defendant's
rights under the Agreement, one is consideration for the other.
The Plaintiffs breach of the Agreement is a legal defense to the
Defendant's obligation to pay:
It is also the rule that a party may not insist upon
the performance of a contract or a provision thereof
where he himself is guilty of a material or substantial
breach of that contract or provision. The party
first committing a substantial breach of a
contract cannot maintain an action against the other
contracting party for a subsequent failure to perform
if the promises are dependent. A failure to perform a
promise, the performance of which is a condition
precedent, is an excuse for nonperformance of the
promise or promises made by the other party.
17 AmJur 2d Contracts §425 at 880. (footnotes omitted).
As a rule, a party first guilty of a substantial
or material breach of contract cannot complain if the
other party thereafter refuses to perform. He can
neither insist on performance by the other party
nor maintain an action against the other party for a
subsequent failure to perform. At least, the party
first committing a substantial breach of a contract
cannot maintain an action against the other contracting
party for a subsequent failure to perform if the
promises are dependent. It has also been said that
where a contract is not performed, the party who is
guilty of the first breach is generally the one upon
whom rests all the liability for the nonperformance.
Furthermore, there is authority that if the breach
of a stipulation in a contract is willful, the party
guilty of the breach is barred from recovery.
17 AmJur 2d Contracts §365 at 807. (footnotes omitted).

(

(

4

^
^
*

*

g

When Plaintiffs first filed a Complaint, Defendant
4
answered admitting execution of the Note but denying an obligation
to pay because the Note was "part and parcel of an agreement
not performed by Plaintiffs.ff Answer at Paragraph #2, Appendix
Document #3. Plaintiffs First Affirmative Defense further stated •
that Plaintiffs were estopped from suing on the obligation by
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-17reason of Plaintiffs failure to "perform their agreement with
Defendants which was the consideration for said note.11 Id.
at Paragraph #8. At a later date Defendants filed a counterclaim
that stated these defects in Plaintiffs performance specifically,
to wit:
Plaintiffs have breached their agreement of
June 27, 1979 with Defendants in that Plaintiffs
have failed to account for funds due Defendants
on subcontracts, have entered into competition
against Defendants and have failed to release
Defendants from liability on the Willowcreek
Project.
Counterclaim at Paragraph #1, Appendix Document #4. The last
defense became inconsequential when Plaintiffs dismissed that
claim with prejudice in the summer of 1982. Defendant's other
two defenses remained as both affirmative defenses and counterclaims . The court acknowledged their presence and viability
in its Order reserving those two matters for trial. Memorandum
Decision, Appendix Document 5 .
The jury's special verdict indicates beyond question
that Plaintiffs did breach their contract with Defendants. The
special verdict answer does not indicate on which defense
Defendants prevailed or if Defendants prevailed on both, but
Defendants did prevail on at least one legal defense. Each
of those defenses constitutes a legal defense to the obligation
on the agreement and note. Special Verdict Form, Appendix
Document # 6
The PlaintiffT,s argument that somehow their case is
insulated from this defense is clearly wrong. Plaintiffs are
not holders in due course:
(1) A holder in due course is a holder who takes
the instrument
(c) without notice . . . of any defense
against or claim to it on the part"""
of any person.
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-18§ 70A-3-302 UCA 1953. Plaintiffs dealt directly with Defendant.
Defendant agreed to pay money to Plaintiffs as expressed in the
Agreement and repeated in the Note. In return Plaintiffs
expressly promised not to compete and to pay over on subcontracts. (
Each knew and agreed to these duties. This was one agreement
with consideration to each party. The jury found that Plaintiffs
breached their agreement. That breach constitutes a legal defense
between these parties and is a bar to Plaintiff's enforcement
<
of the Note.
!

Want or failure of consideration is a defense as
against any person not having the rights of a
holder in due course'. . .
§70A-3-408 UCA 1953.
The Note and Agreement should be treated as one
agreement setting forth the rights of the parties with mutual
ongoing, and reciprocal promises by each. Plaintiff's breach
of the Agreement is a valid affirmative defense to Defendant's
obligation on the Note. Plaintiffs are not holders in due
course. First Investment Company v. Anderson 621 P2d 683
(Ut 1980) .
III.

.

-

THE TRIAL COURT MISINTERPRETED THE SPECIAL JURY VERDICT
FORM.
i

The Defendant has urged that the trial court erred in
using a special verdict form which treated the Note as entirely
distinct from the Agreement between the parties. Further, that
it erred as a matter of law and disobeyed its own Order and
commitment when it set up a form which failed to allow for
Defendant's affirmative defenses to the Note. Nevertheless it
is Defendant's position that the Court can correct the trial
court's errors by properly interpreting that returned special
verdict form.
Defendant
urges that the jury's decision embodied in the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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-19(This argument is best followed by reviewing the Form, Appendix
Document # 6 while considering the argument.) Inasmuch as
the Defendant admitted execution and nonpayment of the Note
the exact words of which are also embodied verbatim in the
Agreement; the jury as a matter of law and obvious fact could
not choose an answer indicating that Defendant was not in
breach of the Agreement. This rules out any answer which
indicates Defendant was not in breach, namely Maff and "c".
Defendant's breach was openly admitted; the entire case was
that Defendant's breach was excused by Plaintiff's own prior
and continuing breach of the same Agreement. If Defendant failed
to prove this defense the jury could clearly choose answer "d".
If the Defendant proved the breach of Plaintiff, the only answer
the jury could give and which is left is answer f,bM. That is the
answer the jury chose. The judge erred in entering a judgment
against the Defendants and for the Plaintiffs; clearly the
Defendants proved their case.
The judge's interpretation of Question #2's answer
creates a situation where any result,results in a loss to the
Defendant. All answers lead to the same result; Plaintiff wins
the face amount of the Note, interest and attorney fees.
If the jury answers "b", they are instructed to make
no further determinations; whereupon the court entered judgment
for the Note, interest and attorney fees. That was the result.
Results "a" and "c" are wrong as a matter of law and fact, as
Defendant admitted breach and alleged defenses. Result "d"
could only lead to a further judgment against Defendant. Out of
four possible results, two are barred by law and the other two
lead to a judgment against Defendant for the Note, interest and
attorney fees. Under the judge's method of interpretation, no
possible result could have been in Defendant's favor.
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-20Defendant submits that the trial judge's interpretation <
is erroneous. The answer "b" is a jury finding that Plaintiffs
were in breach of the Agreement. As the two specific breaches
alleged by Defendant both antedated nonpayment of the Note and
were material and significant breaches, Defendant's nonperformance <
is excuseable. That bars recovery of interest, attorneys fees
and costs by the Plaintiffs. Defendant should also be granted
judgment for damages in the amount proven to result from those
breaches. Unfortunately the court barred the jury from
*
proceeding to determine amounts.
The Defendant alleged failure to pay #1802.00 over on
a specific subcontract and for a recovery of damages for
competition in the amount of the $2505.00 goodwill set forth in
the original Agreement. The Court can either remand for an
evidentiary hearing on these amounts or simply direct the trial,
court to enter the lower figure which Defendant would accept so
as to avoid the retrial of this matter.
The point is that the jury found in favor of the Defendant1
allegation of Plaintiff's breach of the Agreement. The trial
court's misinterpretation of the special verdict form can be
^
corrected by this Court although further evidentiary hearings
may be necessary.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO CONSIDER DEFENDANT'S
OFFERS OF JUDGMENT.

The court record is replete with numerous offers of the
Defendant to pay the Note in full in several different dates:
1.

Oral offer prior to filing of suit

2.

Written Letter to Plaintiff's Attorney of
December 12, 1980. Appendix Document #9.
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3** Offer of Judgment dated February 4, 1981.
Appendix Document #10.
4.

Offer of Judgment dated November 23, 1981.
Appendix Document #11.

The Defendant has explained that these offers were made not
because of a disbelief in the correctness of the affirmative
defenses and counterclaims but because the legal costs and
risks of enforcing its rights exceeded the probable benefits of
winning.
The Defendant's dilemna should be made clear to this
Court. The Defendant considered its legal position and the
expenses of enforcing that position carefully both before and
during this litigation. For that reason, the Defendant made
a full price offer on the Note before suit was commenced and
subsequently in writing on two separate occasions. The Plaintiffs
refused these offers for two reasons. Initially, they were refuse
because Plaintiffs wished to pursue the Second Cause of Action
or wanted alternatively some hold on the Defendant Shaw respecting
his testimony in that case. The Plaintiff's voluntary dismissal
with prejudice of that cause of action when finally pushed to
trial thereof is equivalent to the release requested by Defendants
The refusal of the offers on this ground is legally indefensible.
By the time they had abandoned this Second Cause of Action,
Plaintiffs had incurred substantial legal fees so now their
refusal was based on Defendant?:s refusal to pay those fees.
The only material reason the Plaintiffs refused to
accept Defendant's offer of full payment on the Note was
because of a desire to pursue an unrelated claim on a purported
partnership. Defendants made a legal decision not to contest the
Note and that offer is duly recorded. If Plaintiffs had prevaile<
on the Second Cause of Action the offers would be ineffective
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-22but given their dismissal the offers constituted offers of full
payment on the Note.
Defendants urge that it is unconscionable
to place them in a position of increased liability where Plaintiffs
rejected those offers to pursue an abortive claim Plaintiffs
<
later acknowledged to be without merit. The only excuse
Plaintiffs can offer for running up costs and attorneys fees is
that they desired to make a recovery on the Second Cause of
Action. Defendants should not be required to pay the costs
<
and attorneys fees thereby resulting. As a matter of law the
trial court should have held Plaintiffs refusal to accept
these offers barred and estopped Plaintiffs from recovery
thereof.
A
V.

THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF ATTORNEYS FEES TO THE PLAINTIFFS
IS IN ERROR.

Defendants have previously discussed the interrelationship
of Plaintiff's attorneys fees and the Defendant's offers of
settlement at Section VI hereof. Defendants urge that Plaintiff's
counsel's refusals to segregate time or costs between the two
|
causes of actions bars Plaintiff's recovery of attorneys fees.
Mr. Malouf testified that his arrangement with his
client was for a one-third contingency on the First Cause of
Action and for hourly billings on the Second Cause of Action.
i
Reporter's Transcript at Vol. II 45-46. Mr. Malouf admitted
that he did not segregate his time between the two causes of
action. Id. at 47-49. Mr. Malouf even admitted that he
refused to may any effort to segregate time at his deposition.
*
Id. at Vol. II, page 48 line 22 to page 49 line 15. See
Deposition of Ray Malouf at pp 13-14.
At trial Mr. Malouf asked for one-third of the Note as
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-23reasonable attorneys fees.

In support of this request he

stated that:
The amount of charges which I have recorded for all
of the work done on this case amounts to a total
through trial of $7,023.26. The billing that I am
entitled to on collection on the note is somewhat
• less than that. A third of' the note in round figures
would be $4,900.00, which is all I would be entitled to
for work and collection on the Note.
Reporter's Transcript at Vol. II p. 38. He referred to that same
amount again in his closing argument to buttress his claim for
fees. Id. at 210. While Mr. Malouf did not request that
amount he uses it to support the reasonableness of a one-third
contingency fee of $4900.00. Indeed, hourly billing charges
are a necessary support to show the reasonableness of a contingent
fee. Mr. Malouf failed and refused to segregate his time
charges for this purpose.
The unfairness of Mr. Maloufs billing systems becomes
obvious when his testimony is studied. On December 12, 1980,
Defendant offered to pay the Note, principal and interest in full
Mr. Malouf was asked what a fair attorneys fee for Mr. Shaw
to pay was as of that date. He testified first that a fair fee
was $1000.00. Reporter's Transcript at 54-57. Mr. Malouf testifi
that "I looked at my time to that point". Reporter's Transcript
at Vol III page 55 line 9. A letter is then introduced which
shows that Plaintiff's counsel at that time demanded #1300.00
for attorneys fees to that same date. Exhibit #9. Mr. Malouf
explains this contradiction by stating "so I will correct my
former testimony that a reasonable fee would be at least $1300.00
Reporter's Transcript at Vol II pg. 62 lines 5-8. Inasmuch as
Mr. Malouf had submitted a time billing at his Deposition the
Court will note that his total time and costs on all causes of
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Raymond Malouf, Insert at Back. This waffling makes it clear
why Mr. Malouffs refusal to segregate time is prejudicial error.
With some humor it is noted that the special verdict
form in Question #1 does not indicate to whom the attorneys
fees are to be awarded. See Appendix Document # 6
It asks
the question in a completely abstract way. Plaintiff's
attorney asked for an award of one third; which he computed to
be $4900.00. Reporter's Transcript at Vol II page 38 line 7.
Defendant's attorney submitted a billing of $4809.22. Exhibit
#16. The jury entered the sum of $4800.00.
This Court in Imperial-Yuma Production v. Hunter, 609
P2d 1329, 1331, (Ut 1980) dealt with this same issue:

<

i

*

The promissory note which defendants signed with
Imperial-Yuma contained an agreement that defendants would
pay reasonable attorney's fees and costs required to
4
collect on the note. At trial, plaintiff's counsel
testified the fee for his time came to $7,164.00, but
he had "made no allocations as between the various
aspects of the case in terms of time." If all counsel's
time had been spent in collecting on the note, there
would be no question about the recoverability of his
•
fees. However, since defendant filed a counterclaim
that contained claims different from those related to
the note, plaintiff's counsel should have subtracted
from his total hours the number spent on the counterclaim.
Two recent cases bear on this point. In Stubbs v.
m
Hemmert, 567 P2d 168,171 (Utah 1977), this Court held
•
attorney's fees could be charged to the opposing
party "only if there is a contractual or statutory
liability therefor." Counsel in that case was not
allowed to recover for the time he spent in defense
of a counterclaim. In Nelson v. Newman, 583 P2d 60,
*
603-04 (Utah 1978), the court cited Stubbs in disallowing
attorney's fees where counsel could not show how much
time he had spent on collecting on notes.
This case involved a second cause of action which
Plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed. That cause of action not
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-25the Note was the real primary cause of this litigation.
This case involved a claim for punitive damages against Defendant
Keith Shaw that Plaintiffs failed to prove. This case involved
a claim that Plaintiffs were entitled to pierce the corporate
veil and hold Defendants Shaw personally liable, that also
the Plaintiffs failed to prove. Another major part of the case
were Defendant's affirmative defenses and counterclaims which
Defendant proved and Plaintiffs lost with respect thereto. The
only part of the case that Plaintiffs succeeded with was the
Note and Defendant admitted that in the Answer filed. Plaintiffs
have incurred excessive attorneys fees in a group of losing,
nonsensical and irrelevant claims. Defendant should not have
to pay the cost thereof.
VI.

THERE IS NO LEGAL BASIS FOR THE ENTRY OF ANY JUDGMENT
AGAINST KEITH SHAW OR SANDRA SHAW.

Sandra Shaw ceased to be a party to this litigation when
the Second Cause of Action was dismissed on July 12, 1982. See
Hearing Transcript at 1,3-4. The remaining First Cause of
Action requests no relief whatsoever with respect to Sandra
Shaw and none should be granted. See Complaint, Appendix Document

£2.
Keith Shaw is alleged to be the alter ego of the
corporate Defendant and Plaintiff alleged entitlement to pierce
the corporate veil and attach personal liability to him. No such
proof was ever offered by Plaintiff at trial and no such judgment
can be rendered against Defendant Keith Shaw.
It should be noted that to forestall any collection
activities by the Plaintiff on the partial summary judgment,
Defendant Springcolor Systems, Inc., had previously presented
a Letter of Credit in the amount of $14,000.00 to the court.
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-26See Court file at 309, Appendix Document #12. Because of this
placement of a Letter of Credit there was no reason to pursue
piercing the corporate veil. The court actually held the Letter
of Credit at the time of the trial and the same was a valid
posting of security by Defendant Springcolor Systems, Inc.

{

There is no legal basis whatsoever to enter any judgment
against these two individual Defendants.
VII.

IRRESPECTIVE OF WHAT OTHER RELIEF IS GRANTED THE COURT
SHOULD CORRECT THE TRIAL COURT'S AWARD OF COSTS.

i

At the time the trial court held its April 7, 1983
hearing preparatory to entering its judgment on the special verdict!
Defendant's counsel objected to the award of costs of $471.40.
Hearing of April 7, 1983 at 10,11. The bases of the objection was
that the majority of the costs related to Plaintiff's Second
Cause of Action which was dismissed. TA. The court acknowledged '
the cost memorandum was in error on this point, indicated what
changes were incorrect but refused to correct the same. The
court also refused to ask for a segregation of costs as to
causes of action:

4

THE COURT:
ITm saying the $43.60 and the $353.80 at
this point in my opinion are not proper charges.
MR. DAINES: Will the court amend its judgment to
reflect that?
THE COURT:
No; I?m simply telling you that because
I don't want to spend two or three days waiting for a judgment
.
of amendment and getting it signed and holding it up any longer . .
MR. DAINES: Your Honor, excuse me, the problem with
that is, Your Honor, is if you are acknowledging that there is
something improper about your judgment right now, we should
|
correct it right now, and I don't see that we need to extend the
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-27delay. Let's just put a different figure on there right now so
we don't have to deal with that issue on appeal.
MR. MALOUF: I object to that.
THE COURT:
Well, and he thinks that I am wrong and
so why not? If you are going to appeal it, you just as well
have them pass on that.
MR. DAINES: Inevitably then they will have to reverse
you, in part.
THE COURT:
Well, neither one of you have furnished
me anything on that other than your views, so I'm giving you
my views but we will leave the judgment in as it is.
MR. DAINES: Well, Your Honor, I don't know how to
make an appeal on that issue because without him being forced
to even segregate them, the Supreme Court is not going to take
evidence as to what they are, what those costs are.
THE COURT:
Well, thatfs your argument.
MR. MALOUF: I don't think we have to segregate them.
MR. DAINES: Well, now, wait a minute, I can't go up
on appeal and say the Court entered a judgment and then acknowledg
that part of it was wrong, and Malouf says, well, it's not wrong
because of these reasons, and we are going to be back to try and
introduce evidence that the Supreme Court doesn't have before it.
THE COURT:
Well, be that as it may, we are going to go,
Hearing Transcript of April 7, 1983 at 29, 31-32, Appendix
Document #13.
The Defendants point on this issue is simple; a large
portion of the costs being assessed relate to the Plaintiff's
Second Cause of Action which was dismissed with prejudice.
Defendants position is that having dismissed this cause of
action with prejudice no costs therefore can be assessed. The
court refused to correct the error despite admitting the same
was in error. The court also refused to require Plaintiff's
counsel to segregate those costs. Admittedly that leaves this
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-28Court in a quandry because the necessary evidentiary
background is not available. Defendants would suggest that
irrespective of what it does on the broader issues in this case
the Court should reverse the judgment in part and remand for an
evidentiary hearing on this question or alternatively simply
strike the $43.60 and $353.80 cost assessments referred to by
the trial court judge.
'

'

•

•

•

'

•

'

i

CONCLUSION
Defendants urge this Court to correct the numerous
legal errors made by the trial court in its handling of this
{
matter. The trial court's refusal to correct even the most
obvious legal errors such as the costs assessed against Defendants
when the court openly admits'knowledge of its error indicates
casual indifference to justice. While that is an error of no
(
great consequence it is not a nominal error to enter and allow
a $20,000.00 judgment against a non party to litigation such as
Sandra Shaw. There is no justification for such a judgment.
The court's on again off again treatment of Defendant's ^
affirmative defenses has resulted in manifest injustice, significan*
monetary loss and is clear legal error. All of this has occurred
in a factual mileau wherein the Defendant in jury trial has
proven the soundness of its allegations and defenses.
'
DATED this 3{j
day of August, 1983.
DAINES & KANE

N. George D a t e e s
A t t o r n e y a t Law
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